U.S. Coast Guard
Marine Safety Office San Diego
2001 Business Plan Report

Marine Safety Office San Diego's items extracted from the
2001 U.S. Coast Guard Activities San Diego Business Plan

U.S. Coast Guard Activities San Diego
"ONE COAST GUARD TEAM: Protecting lives, property and the environment."

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office San Diego
"Serving the Maritime Community, Protecting the Marine Environment"

Commanding Officer
Coast Guard Marine Safety Officer San Diego
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 683-6500
www.uscg.mil/d11/sandiego/mso

Introduction

Our 2001 Business Plan provides a glimpse of the Coast Guard before the terrorist attacks of September 11th. This office was heavily focused protecting mariners from accidents and the environment from pollution. At that time, we addressed port security and anti-terrorism in task 1.1.2 under National Defense: "Applying lessons learned, identify tasking/gaps in Port Readiness/Homeland Defense and security (doctrine, ownership, resources) and respond to emergent tasking from operational commanders." Since September 11th, we certainly have learned lessons and applied them to fix gaps.

Our area of responsibility (AOR) is surprisingly large. Our coastal AOR extends from San Mateo Point, CA, south to the US/Mexico border, then west out to the 200nm Economic Exclusion Zone, and south along the Mexican territorial sea to the limits of resource capabilities. The Inland AOR spans a region of four states along the Colorado River and its adjacent lakes: California's Imperial County, all of Arizona, southern Nevada, and six counties in southwestern Utah. The Officer in Charge of Marine Inspections' AOR also includes the western coast of Mexico down to latitude 20N. In this area we are responsible for vessel inspections and certain investigations.



In 2001 we continued to experience the type of growth highlighted in our previous Business Plan reports. Graph one shown the growth in the maritime field. Most relevant is the continued growth of our fleet of inspected vessels, which has now reached 189. Graph two shows the regional economic growth that continues to fuel the maritime growth. The trends clearly predict further significant growth.

While September 11th dramatically changed our focus in the latter half of the year, we still accomplished much of what we set out to do at the beginning of the year. Our work with the U.S. Navy through the Regional Oil Spill Working Group (ROSWG) had a significant impact oil spills from naval assets (see Protection of Natural Resources, strategy 2.1.) Our Targeted Boarding program continued to show positive results as we expended this program out into the Lakes area (see Minimize Marine Casualties, strategy 1.5.) We completed our analysis project of the year 2000 personnel casualties and shared these insights with our passenger vessel fleet (see Minimize Marine Casualties, strategy 10a.) Finally, we continued to improve the usefulness of our website leading to continued growth in use (see graph 25.)

Operations Business Goals

Multi-mission, Maritime, Military

Safety: Eliminate deaths, injuries, and property damage associated with maritime transportation, fishing and recreational boating.

Goal 1. Minimize Marine Casualties

With the noted growth seen in the maritime sector of course the number of Marine Casualties has also grown (see graph 3.) Normalized by the size of our inspected fleet[1] shows no clear trend (see graph 4.)

The visible rise in casualties in 2000 (see graph 5) is primarily the result of only two unusual incidents involving 21 people (a helicopter crash involving a Military Sealift Command Vessel and a smallboat capsizing in the Sea of Cortez involving UC Davis professor Dr. Polis.) Further analysis of these trends is underway as a follow up to strategy 10a under the goal of minimizing marine casualties.

The number of navigation related casualties (collisions, allisions and groundings) shows a rise in 2001 after being lower in 1999 and 2000 (see graph 6.) Partially responsible for the rise is an Oceanside construction project's errant pipe that caused a rash of allisions in 2001.[2]

Marine casualties on passenger vessels (more than 6) show similar trends in graph 7 and graph 8. Our fleet of inspected "T-boats" makes up most of the vessels in this category.

Strategy 1.1: *Minimize allisions, collisions and groundings by tracking and evaluating incidents and developing solutions. Review every USCG and local LE report for lessons learned. Track incidents as they relate to problem areas, specifically Nav Aid issues. Develop improved waterway management systems as appropriate.*

Task 1.1.1*: Complete WAMS studies scheduled for CY2001.*

Our WAMS project was completed. Scheduled every 4 years, our next study will commence in 2003.

Task 1.1.2*: Review WAMS 'advertising' methods to increase industry/public involvement and develop improved WAMS systems as appropriate.*

The current system of involving all known waterways users is still valid. Future system might include e-mail distribution in addition to in person outreach.

Task 1.1.3: *Maintain commercial vessel casualty data, periodically analyze trends and make appropriate recommendations.*

This casualty data discussed above (graph 3 through graph 8) is being analyzed here and through specific programs including strategy 10a under the goal of minimizing marine casualties and our follow on analysis of the difference between the 2000 and 2001 personnel casualties (2002 Business Plan).

[1] While the casualty figure includes foreign vessels, uninspected commercial vessels and certain recreational vessels casualties, the size of our inspected fleet was used for two reasons. First, as an indicator of maritime growth it is the most relevant to our area of responsibility. Second, it is a highly accurate figure.

[2] It should be noted that both fluctuations (personnel casualties and collisions, allisions & groundings) may be normal statistical phenomena. Also, the change from the Coast Guard's old data system (MSIS) to the new MISLE system and the accompanying MARS data analysis program (used here) may have introduced some error into the most recent data. Further analysis and observation of the trends over time should show what factors are at work here.

Strategy 1.2: *Ensure all appropriate actions are taken to prevent injuries, deaths and property damage to waterway users and spectators of Marine Events and other on water events.*

Port Operations is working closely with Activities San Diego in reviewing all proposed events. Since 9/11 our precautions have increasingly addressed possible terrorist acts.

> ***Task 1.2.1:*** *Develop and implement a formal After Action/Lessons-Learned process for Marine Events so as to provide useful documentation for subsequent events.*
>
> The CG SAILS database (described in COMDTINST M3010.19A) satisfies this need for larger lessons learned. Patcoms are now also using a simple after action form for sharing lessons learned. These reports are included in the Marine Event Permit folders for reference during next permit request.
>
> ***Task 1.2.2:*** *Evaluate Marine Event Permitting responsibilities and determine appropriate collateral staffing.*
>
> We completed our initial assessment and decided to include Auxiliarists in the process while otherwise leaving the system unchanged. We have also requested a billet increase to improve our staffing in this regard.

Strategy 1.3: *Actively implement ASD Instruction for Rules of the Road Enforcement.*

To further increase the level of attention given to navigation rule enforcement, the responsibility for prosecuting violations was transferred from POPS to INV. The Investigations department is taking action on the first cases and is working with the station OINC.

> ***Task 1.3.1:*** *Review options (Station, WPBs, Harpol, Harbor Safety Committee, etc.) for applying "Shadow Program"/prosecuting Rules of the Road violations.*
>
> Eclipsed by our greatly increased Port Security operations, the "shadow program" was not further developed in 2001.

Strategy 1.4: *Partner with other agencies to reduce deaths and injuries on the Colorado River.*

> ***Task 1.4.1:*** *Develop future plans for the 4 Colorado River working groups. (Conclude groups, or develop specific plans for continuing efforts where needed).*
>
> Much outreach and cooperation following 9/11 for homeland security issues including the establishment of security zones at the four major dams and the delegation of enforcement authority to Parks & Services. Other strategies were eclipsed by these efforts.

Strategy 1.5: *Targeted Boarding – Continue to operate and evaluate the Targeted Boarding Program.*

Our Targeted Boarding program reaped strong results despite the Inflatable Buoyant Apparatus' initiatives/implementation efforts and our temporary cut back of the program in the latter half of the year while Inspectors initiated our Sea Marshals program. Graph 10 and graph 11 show our results in the San Diego coastal area, while graph 12 shows our expansion of the program into the Colorado River's Lakes area.

> ***Task 1.5.1:*** *Counsel Small Passenger Vessel (SPV) operators, during Coast Guard Inspections, on conducting proper periodic self-inspections.*
>
> Between January and December 2001 Marine Inspectors counseled over 240 small passenger vessel crews on proper inspection and stowage of lifesaving gear, ISM audits, periodic self-inspections, marine casualty reporting procedures, & crew drills. This was accomplished during scheduled inspections and also during unannounced targeted boardings. Efforts continue to increase Mariner's knowledge of U.S. safety regulations on small passenger vessels operating in our AOR.

Task 1.5.2: *Evaluate and implement changes to the program as necessary to maintain effectiveness.*

We extended the Targeted Boarding program to the SPV fleet operating on the Lakes of the Colorado River. We conducted 25 boardings on inland lake vessels uncovering 62 deficiencies (see graph 12.) The number of discrepancies per vessel was 2.5, which resembles the number originally seen on the local sport fishing fleet in San Diego in 1997 when the program first started (see graph 10.) We expect to see a reduction in discrepancies similar to our local fleet's improvement.

Task 1.5.3: *Measure average number of deficiencies per vessel to determine success of the program. Compile boarding statistics and assess program's effectiveness on SPV vessels readiness for unannounced inspections. Provide results during semi-annual and annual Business Plan reports.*

Between January and December 2001, we conducted 26 Targeted Boardings uncovering 17 deficiencies on small passenger vessels operating within our local San Diego based fleet (see graph 10.) The purpose of these boardings are to keep pressure on owners to maintain their vessels in accordance with the terms of their Certificate of Inspection throughout the year. As shown in graph 11, an average of .5 deficiencies per boarding were identified during the 2000 calendar year. During 2001 the average was .8 per boarding. We believe this rise of .3 deficiencies per boarding was closely tied to the fact we did not target many vessels during the winter months (due to Inflatable Buoyant Apparatus' initiatives/implementation).

Overall this program has achieved great success. Since the inception of this program in 1997, the overall number of deficiencies has declined by 75%. In 2002 the program will be modified slightly to include a system that bases boarding criteria on a more encompassing vessel matrix that includes area of operation (exposed waters), the type of hull material, etc., to assess overall risk. Also, owners will receive annual letters letting them know their vessels relative risk ranking as either above or below the port average.

Task 1.5.4: *Pursue letters of warning or civil penalty violations for deficiencies.*

Nine civil penalty cases were forwarded to the Investigations Department during CY01 for non-compliance with U.S. regulations. (Five for unauthorized modifications to a vessel two for operating beyond the Dry Dock date, one for operating with insufficient number of lifejackets and one for a vessel operating with overdue CG-835 deficiencies.) The Investigations Department has been limited in its ability to aggressively pursue these cases due to the staff shortage noted in strategy 1.6 below. In an effort to improve this situation an inspections qualified Auxiliarist was employed to spearhead these cases under a 2002 Business Plan initiative. This Auxiliarist is rapidly learning to process these cases and has already submitted three for Command review.

Strategy 1.6: *Respond to 300% increase in external Investigations Dept workload since 1992 and improve current capabilities by finding additional resources and methods for casualty analysis.*

In 2001 our steady increase in cases took a slight rest (see graph 9.) As optimistic as the year 2001 looks, the noted trends (graph 1 & graph 2) indicate that we must continue to expect growth in all our activities. As shown in graph 5, a change in the number personnel casualties is the source of the fluctuation. Following on strategy 10a (under minimizing marine casualties), we are conducting a comparative analysis of the year 2000 and 2001 personnel casualties (2002 Business Plan).

Task 1.6.1*: Initiate reprogramming process for an additional billet.*

We completed this task and in 2002 resubmitted our request with data showing the significant increasing trends (see graph 1 and graph 2.)

By rotating personnel within the unit, the Investigations Department had a net gain of two Reservists and one Auxiliarist.

***Task 1.6.2**: Increase the number of qualified Marine Casualty Investigators from the current four including Reservists and Auxiliarists.*

Through training and inclusion of more qualified personnel we greatly increased the number of qualifications held in the department from a total of 5 qualifications to 11. This includes two newly qualified Reserve Investigating Officers and our first Auxiliarist qualified as Marine Casualty Investigating Officer.

***Strategy 1.7:** DAPI (Drug & Alcohol Program Inspection) - Reduce drug & alcohol use on commercial vessels in San Diego.*

***Task 1.7.1:** Conduct 100% DAPI audits and vigorously pursue violations.*

We continued DAPI compliance checks at a similar rate to CY2000. 94% of the vessels examined were in full compliance. We have had no reports of violations in companies' drug and alcohol programs.

We initiated ten new drug or alcohol related Suspension & Revocation cases against Coast Guard credentialed mariners in 2001. Of particular note was our pursuit of reasonable cause testing subsequent to a passenger's report of drug use on an inspected passenger vessel. In our aggressive pursuit of this matter, we proved that the drug use occurred on watch and had the mariner's master's license revoked.

***Task 1.7.2:** In addition to statutory enforcement, pursue drug awareness/effect education in maritime community.*

In 2001 we added a new "Seal of Safety"/Drug & Alcohol Program web pages to our web site at www.uscg.mil/d11/sandiego/mso. The site includes information on the chemical testing requirements and an updated list of drug testing facilities. Our latest statistics show these pages being hit on average 343 times per month.

***Strategy 1.8**: CFVS **-** Continue to increase the safety awareness of commercial fishermen. Maintain CY2000 level of completed Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety (CFVS) inspections.*

***Task 1.8.1:** Track program results via database and assess effects in year-end and semi-annual BP reports.*

Following 9/11, our primary CFVS Examiner was tasked new Port Security related duties. While the contact rate necessarily dripped, we still maintained the program's previous high results (see graph 13.) We continued training with the Coast Guard Cutter crews and PAC TACLET on CFVS elements. We noted an increase communications with our Patrol Boat crews regarding boardings they conduct and follow up exams.

***Strategy 1.8a**: Uninspected Passenger Vessel (UPV) **-** Continue to increase the outreach of the "Seal of Safety" decal program and increase regulatory compliance in the UPV fleet.*

***Task 1.8a.1:** Track program results via database and assess effects in year-end and semi-annual BP reports.*

In deference to our mandated duties and increased emphasis on Port Security we had to reduce this program. We reassigned one examiner as an investigator as part of our effort to increase the department's staff (see task 1.6.2 above). Another examiner was transferred to our new Sea Marshals Port Security program (see National Defense, below.) So while we could not expand the program as intended, we were still able to maintain a similar contact and exam rate as in 2000. Most importantly we did not turn any of our prior participants away (see graph 14 and graph 15.)

Taking advantage of the Coast Guard's new database, MISLE (Marine Information for Safety & Law Enforcement), we created a fleet grouping of our "Seal of Safety" vessel for tracking and also started

entering our exams into the system. This will allow for improved tracking and will also show the public which vessels earned a decal (through the Coast Guard's "Port State Information eXchange" (PSIX) System at psix.uscg.mil.)

In creating the fleet grouping we purged nearly 50 vessels from our rolls that were no longer in the business, sold or were erroneous leads. Thus, although we conducted slightly fewer exams, our percentages were up with 63% examined and 48% decaled.

Task 1.8a.2: *Educate UPV operators on "12 hour rule".*

Following on a series of complaints and investigations throughout 2000, we addressed the 12-hour rule directly with the mariners at a multi-agency task force open house in early 2001. Our efforts raised significant discussion, some follow up calls and seem to have made an impact. In contrast to 2000, when we pursued a number of violations, in 2001 we uncovered no 12-hour rule violations and received no reports of any violations.

Strategy 1.9: *(PTP/Port Familiarity) Develop Prevention-Through-People policy that provides a clear list of port familiarity requirements to small passenger vessels operating within San Diego Harbor and establish guidelines for educating mariners on port dangers and casualties.*

Task 1.9.1: *Establish and periodically update a list of common port dangers and casualties.*

We helped bring the San Diego Marine Information System (SDMIS) online at www.sdmis.com. Port dangers are listed on the site. We also had the San Diego Bay nautical chart updated.

Task 1.9.2*: Discuss port dangers and findings of recent casualties and civil penalty violations trends with licensed Mariner's during statutory and unannounced vessel boardings.*

The MSO departments developed a safety bulletin that was mailed out that encompassed port dangers, upcoming regulatory changes and findings of recent casualties. The next edition of the marine safety newsletter has been drafted and split into the 9 sections for each section of industry. It is currently undergoing command approval. Once approved, it will be e-mailed to industry and posted on the MSO San Diego website.

Task 1.9.3: *Measure success through reduction in casualty stats on inspected SPV fleet. Provide quarterly updates at QMB.*

Taking advantage of the Coast Guard's new MARS data analysis program we can now review the casualty statistics for our SPV fleet back to 1992. (In the 2000 report we could only review two years of data.) Graph 7 shows the overall casualty rate similar to that for all vessels (graph 3.) The graph of collisions, allisions and groundings (graph 8) shows a general rise with a not yet explained spike in 1996. Noting that the range from the highest to the lowest year encompasses only 12 incidents, these variances may not be statistically significant.

Task 1.9.4: *Publish MSO safety bulletin/newsletter including deficiency trends and upcoming regulatory safety changes. Compile input from POPS and INV annually.*

See task 1.9.2 above.

Task 1.9.5: *Fully utilize the MSO San Diego website as a means of educating mariners.*

Particularly in the wake of 9/11, our web site proved its value as a tool for educating mariners. Graph 24 shows the significant growth in traffic our pages have received. In the week following 9/11 our site's traffic quadrupled as we rapidly posted important Port Security updates online. We have since created a separate page with all our Homeland Security information.

Through our web site we have also grown our public e-mail list, which now numbers 59. We regularly use our e-mail list to get out press releases and information important to mariners.

Our web site is at www.uscg.mil/d11/sandiego/mso.

Strategy 1.10: *Small Passenger Vessel (SPV) personnel casualty reduction – seek means to reduce the number of personnel casualties occurring on SPVs.*

Task 1.10.1: *Meet with key industry members/reps starting 16Nov00 and develop solutions to crew fatigue issues using Passenger Vessel Association risk guide.*

On 16 November 2000, we convened a Quality Action Team (QAT) to study the affects of fatigue on the sportfishing community and to develop workable solutions to the problem. The team was comprised of members from the Sportfishing Association of California (SAC), Arnold & Arnold Insurance Underwriters, & MSO's LA/LB & San Diego.

Task 1.10.2: *Develop recommendations to OCMI from input of fatigue solution work group.*

To date the QAT has developed a problem statement, root causes, and is working to finalize recommendations to OCMI LA/LB & OCMI San Diego. Further actions are pending.

Task 1.10.3: *Present at 21Mar01 SAC Safety Seminar update on fatigue solutions workgroup progress.*

SAC was updated on the QAT's progress, and was supportive of the direction thus far.

Task 1.10.4: *Use SAC feedback as final validation process and implement fatigue solutions accordingly.*

The QAT still plans on presenting their findings and recommendations to OCMI's LA/LB & San Diego in the near future. SAC members have delayed their actions due to other pressing issues, but still plan on working through their insurance and Casualty Review Committee to establish a program intended to improve their watchstanding practices within their sportfishing fleet. Once complete, MSO LA & MSO San Diego will review the program to provide comments. The QAT will then reconvene to give a final review to the draft and to finalize recommendations in writing to the OCMI's.

Strategy 1.10a*: Small Passenger Vessel (SPV) Personnel Casualty Reduction* ***–*** *Increase understanding of local Marine Casualty dynamics.*

Task 1.10a.1: *Analyze all personnel casualties on SPVs from CY2000, looking for trends.*
Task 1.10a.2: *Review analysis and identify preventative solutions.*
Task 1.10a.3: *Establish implementation plan for preventative solutions.*

Two Auxiliarists painstakingly reviewed 43 incident reports and developed a presentation of their findings to the Command. They uncovered some valuable facts about the dynamics of these casualties including that 39% of all incidents occurred south of the border, that cardiac arrests accounted for 43% of all fatalities and that almost 50% were linked to a "human factor".

To give the most closely involved people a better understanding of the dynamics of the casualties, we presented our findings at the Sportfishing Association of California's annual Safety Conference.

Two action items were taken from this analysis. One, the analysis suggested that the carriage of automatic defibrillators on inspected passenger vessels may be warranted in certain cases. This suggestion will be considered in the next pertinent casualty investigation. The second action item is a comparative analysis of the personnel casualties from 2000 and 2001. As is apparent in graph 5, personnel casualties seem to have spiked in 2000 and dropped in 2001. While the spike is primarily the result of only two unusual incidents involving 21 people (a helicopter crash involving a Military Sealift Command Vessel and a smallboat capsizing in the Sea of Cortez involving UC Davis professor Dr. Polis), this follow on analysis will hopefully further explain these trends.

Strategy 1.11: *Facilitate new technology and mobility through dialogue & recommendations to the Port of San Diego.*

Task 1.11.1: *High Speed Craft (HSC) – Facilitate safe, efficient & feasible high-speed ferry operations between Oceanside and San Diego.*

MSO inspectors assisted the Port of San Diego and CALTRANS evaluate two proposed HSC operators. Over 200 hours of preparation and research were invested into this project with the goal of providing valuable and substantive input in the early stages of development. We expressed our concerns regarding safe speed, reduced visibility, traffic density, crew training and vessel certification to prepare both the Port and the operators for a successful demonstration project. Local stakeholders were also involved with the process. Mariflite was selected as the demonstrator of the project. They intend to use either the CATALINA JET currently operating in LA/LB, or a hydrofoil being certificated by Hawaii. Sea trials are scheduled to begin operations summer 2002.

Task 1.11.2: *High Speed Craft (HSC) – Obtain specialized skills and knowledge pertaining to the certification, maintenance & operation of High Speed Craft.*

Inspectors have obtained the most recent policy guidance and policy on HSC and observed similar operations in Long Beach, San Pedro and Catalina to gather knowledge and experience regarding this operation. Inspectors have established information sharing relationships with other ports where HSC operations are currently being conducted.

Task 1.11.3: *Amphibious Vehicles – Facilitate safe, efficient & feasible amphibious vessel operations within the Port of San Diego.*

We certificated two amphibious vessel operators who have now established safe vessel operations in San Diego. Over 125 hours were invested in this process by the Inspections Department to ensure applicable regulations and policies were met. Depending on the success of this operation the company may add up to four additional vessels to their local fleet.

Task 1.11.4: *Amphibious Vehicles – Obtain specialized skills and knowledge pertaining to the certification, maintenance & operation of amphibious vehicles.*

Inspectors obtained the most recent policy guidance and policy on amphibious vehicles and observed amphibious vehicle operations and conducted inspections. They used their knowledge and experience to establish information sharing with other ports where amphibious vehicle operations are currently being conducted.

Protection of Natural Resources: Eliminate environmental damage and natural resource degradation associated with maritime transportation, fishing and recreational boating.

Goal 2: Eliminate Marine Pollution

As shown in graph 17 the downward trend of the volume of oil spilled continues. The fact that this reduction occurred while the number of spills reported remained relatively constant (graph 16) indicates greater pollution reporting.

Graph 18 through graph 23 show how the spills are distributed by volume.

Strategy 2.1: *Participate in all joint Navy – USCG oil spill reduction efforts, including Regional Oil Spill Working Group (ROSWG), Operational Risk Management and Data Management Working Groups.*

Task 2.1.1 *- Evaluate all transfer related spills and conduct root cause evaluations, forward results to ship class/commands. Continue sampling protocol with Navy. Develop joint Task with Navy to ID and reduce no-source spills at Navy facilities.*

As shown in graph 19 the volume of USN spills is down. The ROSWG and its sub committees have not met in almost a year, primarily due to Naval force protection work since 9/11. Nonetheless, the Navy's system's improvement contractor, Concurrent Technologies Corp., continued working with the local Navy on Scene Coordinator (NOSC) to continue key oil spill prevention initiatives including further organization of sub committees, outreach to local commands and development of future projects.

Strategy 2.2: *Increase and improve efforts in education and prevention.*

Task 2.2.1 *Further develop the Marina Program. Re-establish competition in the Marina program by publishing stats to all USCGR teams.*

Competition has resumed since we started publishing each team's statistics. We conducted four outreach events at marinas and plan on continuing such events at least once per quarter.

Task 2.2.2: *Develop an agenda for and conduct face-to-face meetings with marina operators to discuss environmental issues.*

We conducted this outreach through our Marina Program and the Clean Vessel Act (CVA) Committee. The Port has been involved in the CVA Committee and is helping to resolve Port wide problems. Informational leaflets are being included in the tenants' bills. We printed a Boaters Best Management Practices booklet that the Coast Guard Auxiliary is distributing in the port.

Strategy 2.3: *Improve oil spill readiness.*

Task 2.3.1: *Improve oil spill readiness by creating a standing ICS (Incident Command System) organization that combines State and Coast Guard personnel and contact/recall info.*

We developed an ICS standard organization chart for oil spill responses tasking our unit's personnel with specific ICS assignments. This chart will need updating with each transfer season.

Task 2.3.2: *Improve oil spill readiness by developing additional strategies to track/monitor the ICS training needs of all ASD personnel, and systems of delivering training.*

We established our own training team that is conducting ICS 200 level courses as needed locally. The team is working with the PERSRU to develop PMIS codes for ICS training to improve tracking of ICS training.

To increase familiarity with the system, we also used ICS to coordinate the Activities San Diego Open House event.

Task 2.3.3*: Improve oil spill readiness via participation in a major Navy-led PREPEX.*

Initially delayed following 9/11 this major drill was held in January 2002. The exercise significantly improved the ability of all involved to use ICS and increased our readiness for a major oil spill.

***Task 2.3.4**: Create lightering guidance for Pacific Area Lightering.*
***Task 2.3.5**: Develop MSO COTP Lightering Policy.*

Our lightering policy is still in development in 2002, with stakeholder meetings scheduled. We are also making use of newly developed Integrated Risk Based Decision Making tools to thoroughly evaluate the risks involved in various lightering scenarios.

Mobility: Facilitate maritime commerce and eliminate interruptions and impediments to the economical movement of goods and people, while maximizing recreational access to and enjoyment of the water.

GOAL 1: Facilitate Mobility

***Strategy 1.1:** In response to DOT initiatives and consistent with Waterways Management goals, promote Marine Transportation System through partnerships and community outreach.*

***Task 1.1.1:** Report on success and frequency of outreach efforts.*

We participated in three boat fairs/shows and gave over 30 Sea Partners presentations. We also took advantage of dozens of speaking engagements to a wide range of audiences (including singles sailing groups and congressional staffs.)

***Strategy 1.2:** Improve continuity of commercial vessel inspection services.*

***Task 1.2.1:** Improve corporate knowledge/continuity of vessel inspection services by civilianizing the Assistant Chief of Inspection Dept billet.*

This project is still in development.

***Strategy 1.3:** Leverage available technology to facilitate safe movement within San Diego Bay.*

***Task 1.3.1:** Provide support and complete all tasks necessary to get SDMIS system installed by the APR01 due-date.*

SDMIS was online April 1. 2001. See task 1.9.1 under Minimize Marine Casualties.

Goal 2: Improve Emergency Response Preparedness

***Strategy 2.1:** Further develop Activities ICS and Emergency Response Capabilities.*

***Task 2.1.1:** Partner with PACAREA planning representative to develop all required contingency plans.*

We are currently developing our High Capacity SAR Contingency plan and await the finalization of the Pac annex to the MEXUS plan. Most importantly we have been working with the USN on anti-terrorism/force protection plans.

National Defense: Defend the nation as one of the five U.S. Armed Forces. Enhance regional stability in support of National Security Strategy, utilizing our unique and relevant maritime capabilities.

Goal 1: Provide core competencies including Maritime Interception Operations , Security and Defense; Military Environmental Response Operations, and Peacetime Engagement, when requested by the Department of Defense or Department of State.

Strategy 1.1*: Seek out opportunities to support DOD and DOS maritime training evolutions or other operations where Activities San Diego can test interoperability and/or enhance our ability to meet future national defense needs.*

Task 1.1.2: *Applying lessons learned, identify tasking/gaps in Port Readiness/Homeland Defense and security (doctrine, ownership, resources) and respond to emergent tasking from operational commanders.*

Since 9/11 we have significantly increased our Port Security activities including the development of further security zones and Naval force protection efforts. (The Port of San Diego is home to an estimated 600 billion dollars in Naval assets.)

The most significant addition to our range of Port Security actions is our new Sea Marshals program. The Sea Marshals, which are now fully operational, conduct approximately 80 port security boardings of deep draft vessels every month. We do this as a joint operation with Naval Criminal Investigative Service with additional assistance from the Border Patrol.

Logistics Management Goals

Logistics & Human Resources: Provide the right logistic and human resource capabilities at the right time, in the right place, and at the right cost to achieve CG's Mission, Vision, and Strategic Goals.

Goal 4: Ensure careful stewardship of public dollars.

Strategy 4.6: *Evaluate opportunities for better managing workload/workforce, including better task-sharing with partners, downsizing or eliminating non-statutory functions, etc.*

Task 4.6.1: *Investigate CG jurisdictional options for the Bridgewater Channel (Lake Havasu). If law and regulation provide, consider a new special local regulation, or consider ceding PATCOM authorities via MOU so as to reduce CG costs.*

We investigated this proposal and determined that a new special local regulation was not an option with the inclusion of the temporary Bridgewater Channel Bridge. The bridge has to go through the regulatory process each time it is constructed. We also determined that ceding our PATCOM authority was not an option.

- - -

Graph 1 – Maritime growth statistics



Graph 2 – Economic growth statistics (from the San Diego Chamber of Commerce)



Graph 3 – All Marine Casualties



Graph 4 – All Marine Casualties normalized by MSO San Diego's Inspected fleet (casualties per vessel)



Graph 5 – All Personnel Casualties (Injuries and fatalities)



Graph 6 – All collisions, allisions or groundings



Graph 7 – Marine Casualties on Passenger vessels (more than 6)



Graph 8 – Collisions, allisions or groundings on Passenger vessels (more than 6)



Graph 9 – Investigations Department caseload (Marine Casualties, MC and Suspension & Revocation, SR)



Graph 10 – Targeted Boarding Program



Graph 11 – Targeted Boarding Program, discrepancies per boarding



Graph 12 – Targeted Boarding Program, Lakes area



Graph 13 – Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Exam Program



Graph 14 – Seal of Safety Program and Drug & Alcohol Program Inspection (DAPI)



Graph 15 – Seal of Safety Program and Drug & Alcohol Program Inspection (DAPI), by percentage



Graph 16 – Number of reported oil spills



Graph 17 – Volume of oil spilled (Gallons)



Graph 18 – Percentage of oil spilled in 2001, by volume



Graph 19 – Volume of oil spilled, USN



Graph 20 – Volume of oil spilled, Commercial vessels



Graph 21 – Volume of oil spilled, Recreational vessels



Graph 22 – Volume of oil spilled, Facilities



Graph 23 – Volume of oil spilled, Unknown / other vessels



Graph 24 – Web traffic (www.uscg.mil/d11/sandigego/mso)